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FIRST DRAFT 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the operationalization of citizens’ preferences concerning how political 
decisions should be made. Recent research suggests that process preferences are a 
relevant predictor of the level of confidence citizens have in political institutions. However, 
there is no standardized scale for the measurement of such preferences. Hence, the aim of 
this paper is to present the development and validation of a multi-dimensional scale 
measuring citizens’ preferences concerning political decision-making processes. Based on 
existing research, a theoretical derived model with three dimensions and 16 indicators is 
tested. Those items were evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in structural 
equation modeling (SEM) and validated on another independent sample. The results indicate 
that process preferences consist of three factors: consensus-orientation, competition, and 
the efficiency of political decision-making processes. Moreover, further studies confirmed the 
cultural equivalence of the scale and its invariance as regards two different objects of 
assessment (parliament, government). 
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Problem and Objectives 
This paper focuses on the operationalization of preferences concerning political decision-
making processes. Recent research suggests that process preferences are a relevant 
predictor of citizens’ confidence in political institutions (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 
2002). In line, other studies built on discrepancy theory from cognitive psychology and argue 
that the relationship between the perception of political realities and corresponding 
preferences explains variances in confidence levels (Kimball & Patterson, 1997; Patterson, 
Boynton, & Hedlund, 1969). Those studies focus on attributes of political actors. So far, little 
attention has been paid to the analysis of processes preferences, and there is no 
standardized scale for the measurement of such preferences. 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to make a methodological contribution by reporting the 
development and validation process of a multi-dimensional scale that measures citizens’ 
preferences concerning political decision-making processes. The items were evaluated using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in structural equation modeling (SEM). 
 
Theoretical Framework: Discrepancy Theory And the Role of Preferences in 
Explaining Confidence Levels 
Confidence in political institutions can be conceptualized as a citizen’s feelings that political 
actors behave according to preferred norms of democratic governance (Kaina, 2004). The 
term preference as it is used in this paper refers to "what people want" (Mesquita & 
McDermott, 2004, p. 276); or more precisely preferences are conceptualized as comparative 
evaluations of objects that may be observable or unobservable in their nature (Druckman & 
Lupia, 2000, p. 2f.). Process preferences, thus, refer to the comparative evaluation of 
different aspects of political decision-making, such as the efficiency of political processes or 
the role of compromise-seeking behavior of political actors, for instance.  
We draw on a relational definition of confidence as an attitude that is based on the 
relationship between perceptions of political realities and citizens’ preferences. The literature 
review, hence, focuses on political science literature that builds on discrepancy theory from 
cognitive psychology and argues that the relationship between perceptions and preferences 
explains confidence levels. Patterson and collaborates (Patterson, Boynton, & Hedlund, 
1969) investigate the role of citizens’ expectations as determinant of political support. The 
authors compared perceptions with according expectations concerning characteristic 
attributes that legislators should have and the role that influencing agencies should play. The 
authors assess the influence of that relationship between expectations and perceptions on 
citizens’ support of legislators. The results support the main hypothesis that congruence 
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between perceptions and expectations fosters support, whereas incongruence leads to low 
levels of support. Hence, the authors conclude that perception-expectation differentials 
explain variance in support of the legislators. 
Further empirical support to this line of theorizing is given by a study of Kimball & Patterson 
(1997). The authors analyzed expectations toward incumbents, their motives and 
connections as well as according perceptions of those aspects. The authors state that "public 
attitudes toward Congress hinge very much upon public expectations, [and] citizens’ 
perceptions of congressional performance" (Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 722). 
Hence, we built on a solid foundation in assuming that preferences regarding political actors, 
their characteristics and attributes are explanatory factors of political confidence. This 
assumption guided this work by suggesting that also process preferences matter as an 
explanatory variable of confidence in political institutions. However, there is little explicit 
literature that investigates the precise political process preferences to lead this work in a 
detailed manner.  
Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) in their study on 
process preferences and public approval of government show that the expectations-
perceptions discrepancy not only explains attitudes that are based on the perception of 
political actors but also attitudes based on the perception of political processes. Their 
research indicates that the relationship between citizens’ expectations concerning how 
political processes should operate and the perceptions of how actual procedures take place 
explains confidence (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). The authors state that 
"the extent to which individuals believe actual processes are inconsistent with their own 
process preferences is an important variable in understanding the current public mood" 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 145). Based on focus group data, Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse (2002) argue that American citizens prefer what they call "stealth democracy", that is 
a latent but efficient representation of citizens’ needs. In contrast, deliberation or 
compromise-seeking endeavors are not valued; either because individuals consider them to 
be unnecessary, or because citizens value the avoidance of political disagreement in 
general, or because individuals are not political interested.  
Drawing on this work of Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (2002), efficiency and compromise-seeking 
behavior can be considered as two relevant dimensions of process preferences. Literature 
on citizens’ perceptions of political processes also names efficiency and fair behavior as 
aspects of political processes that are perceived by the citizens (cf. Weatherford, 1992). 
Efficiency refers to policy-making without undue waste of time or resources; fairness refers to 
regular and predictable decision-making processes, and open and equal access to decisional 
arenas. Using data from the National Election Studies, Weatherford (1992, p. 161) could 
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show that the differentiation between those process aspects is not only conceptually 
relevant, but citizens also do distinguish between those different process aspects 
(Weatherford, 1992, p. 161). 
Fairness as a central process dimension is also referred to in the literature on procedural 
justice, which suggests a variety of indicators of perceived fairness (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 
Tyler, 2000; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). Indicators of procedural fairness from a relational 
perspective (i.e., the relationship between members of an organization and the organizations’ 
head) are: status recognition, respectful behavior, trustworthiness, and neutrality. Moreover, 
an equal consideration to the views of different groups and the explanation of decision-
making reasons contributes to the perceived justice. From a control or instrumental 
perspective voice, efficiency, and responsiveness are named as aspects of perceived justice. 
Literature on preference formation suggests that "what people want might be socially 
constructed" (Mesquita & McDermott, 2004, p. 276). It seems plausible to argue that 
preferences regarding political process develop within a distinct cultural setting and are 
therefore shaped by the political culture of a nation. Hence, we also refer to literature on 
different political cultures. The political culture of consensus democracies, such as 
Switzerland for instance, traces back to the dominant role of negotiations and bargaining 
processes and the consensus orientation of political institution. Key characteristics of political 
bargaining are described by Elster (1989, pp. 50-95), who defines bargaining as a decision-
oriented form of communication that aims to achieve a compromise between divergent 
interests. Successful negotiations result in the partial consideration of all participating 
interests in the form of compromises. Negotiations require a confidential and closed 
atmosphere and call for consensus orientation and collective actions with all participants 
winning. This fosters the citizens’ expectation that social problems are best solved based on 
compromises (Linder & Steffen, 2006). 
Coalition bargaining, on the contrary, is not valued in competitive democracies, which are 
shaped by the government-opposition code (Kaase & Newton, 1995). Majoritarian-based or 
hierarchical processes dominate and they are characterized by elements of competition and 
the attribution of political achievements to certain political actors. The according expectations 
are clearly defined programs and parties that are capable of forming governments on their 
own (Kaase & Newton, 1995, p. 134).  
Thus, we suggest another dimension of process preferences: competition. Based on the 
reviewed literature, we argue that process preferences encompass three different 
dimensions: consensus-orientation, competition, and efficiency. We think that citizens’ 
process preferences relate to those three dimensions. The dimensions consensus-
orientation is associated with the respectfulness and fairness of political behavior, the role of 
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compromise-seeking endeavors and the fact that there are no winners and losers in political 
processes. The dimension competition concerns the role of clear orders and the 
decisiveness of political actors when dealing with conflicts or power struggles in competitive 
majoritarian-based decision-making processes. The dimension efficiency refers to easy 
structures of political processes, fast and efficient procedures and the avoidance of delays. 
The three dimensions are assumed to be correlated. 
 
Method 
Based on the reviewed literature three dimensions of process preferences were deduced: 
consensus-orientation, competition, and efficiency. In confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
these dimensions can be modeled as latent variables that each are reflected by several 
correlated indicators. CFA is a technique that can greatly enhance confidence in the 
structure and psychometric properties of a new measure (Noar, 2003). For instance, CFA 
can test a variety of conceptualizations of the data and allow the scale developer to compare 
differing models and ultimately retain the model of best fit.  
Building on indicators of political efficiency, consensus-orientation and competition discussed 
in the literature, a set of 16 preference statements was developed. Those 16 aspects 
constitute the initial process preference item pool. As a requirement for CFA, an initial model 
was developed that specifies how the observed variables are related to the three latent 
factors. The factor consensus-orientation encompasses 6 indicators that relate to the 
respectfulness and fairness of political behavior, whether political parties concede a point to 
the other side, the consideration of diverging interest, the avoidance the distinction between 
winners and losers of a political process, and the role of political compromises. The factor 
competition contains five items that relate to the decisiveness of political actors, the role of 
political conflicts and power struggles, the ability of political parties to put their plans through, 
and the possibility of hierarchical orders. The dimension efficiency includes five variables that 
refer to fast and efficient decision-making processes, simple and short processes, the 
avoidance of delays in decision-making, and the firm stand of political actors. 
The initial model with 16 items was first tested with survey data from Swiss citizens. A 
standardized online survey was conducted as part of an experimental study on the formation 
of political attitudes in May and June 2008 in the German speaking part of Switzerland. The 
survey dealt with attitudes toward the government and politicians. Respondents were 
recruited through the “smartvote” political newsletter;1 hence they are more interested in 
politics than the average Swiss citizen. Moreover, participants had an above-average level of 
                                                 
1 “Smartvote” is an electronic voting decision-making tool in Switzerland The newsletter is regularly sent to all 
registered users of the online-platform www.smartvote.ch 
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higher educational degrees. The survey encompasses two samples, a smaller sample with 
161 participants that served as control group in the further experimental study, and a second 
sample with 372 participants that served as experimental groups later on. The participants 
were randomly assigned to the groups. In the first sample of the survey (n=161) survey, 64 
percent were males, and the age ranged from 19 to 84 (M=42; SD=14.7). In the second 
sample (n=372), 66 percent were males, and the age ranged from 15 to 80 (M= 43; 
SD=15.8). 
The cultural invariance of the scales was tested with data from another study. Surveys were 
conducted with college students in Germany (n=163) and Switzerland (n=150). We only 
conducted the interviews in the German speaking part of Switzerland, which has the 
advantage that no translation of the scales was necessary.2 The college samples seem 
appropriate for the purpose of scale development, where representative samples are not 
necessarily required (Noar, 2003, p. 626). The standardized written surveys were conducted 
in November 2007. The survey dealt with attitudes toward the government and politicians. 
Respondents were recruited in university courses and lectures; hence, the samples had an 
above-average number of participants with higher levels of formal education. In the German 
survey, 42 percent were males, and the age ranged from 18 to 31 (M=22; SD=2.7). In the 
Swiss survey, 51 percent were males, and the age ranged from 18 to 33 (M= 22; SD=2.8). 
 
In a third study the institutional invariance of the scales was tested with data from another 
independent survey with 530 Swiss citizens. The standardized online survey was conducted 
in March and April 2008. Respondents were recruited through post election survey 
conducted by “smartvote” in November and December 2007. Again, they are more interested 
in politics than the average Swiss citizen. In addition, the sample again had an above-
average level of formal education. In the sample 61 percent were males, and the age ranged 
from 16 to 76 (M=38; SD=13.9).  
The scale was designed as a multidimensional research instrument to understand the 
specific preferences that citizens hold concerning how political decisions should be made. 
For each of the three dimensions of political processes identified in the literature review, a 
set of items was derived, resulting in a total of 16 items in the initial item pool. In the survey, 
a 7-point scale response format assessed how relevant several aspects of political making-
decisions are for the individual respondent. This format provides more information than could 
be provided with a dichotomous response scale. The 7-point scale allows for variance and is 
sensitive to slight gradations in responses; an additional "don’t know option" was included. 
When responding to the scale, individuals were asked the following questions:  
                                                 
2 Potential differences in the measurement in the two samples might not be attributed to language differences. 
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"Citizens have different preferences regarding how political decisions should be 
made. Please answer according to the following scale how important you consider 
the various preferences. The scale ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very 
important)".3 
The items for process preferences were tested by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with 
maximum-likelihood parameter estimation. The analysis used EQS version 6.1 software 
(Bentler, 2006). Data were tested for univariate and multivariate normal distribution and 
strong outliers were excluded from data analysis. Extreme violations (moderate ones are 
given in parentheses) on the assumption of the univariate distribution are associated with 
skew values of at least 3 (2) and kurtosis of at least 20 (7) (West et al., 1995). Those values 
were not reached in all of the samples. Yuan, Lambert and Fouladi (2004) developed an 
extension of the Mardia (1970, 1974) test of multivariate kurtosis that can be applied to data 
with missing values. The normalized estimate is interpretable as a standard normal variate, 
the hypothesis of multivariate normality must be rejected if it is outside the range of -3 to +3 
(Bentler, 2006, p. 282f.). The hypothesis of multivariate normality was rejected for the model 
in study three and the distribution-free Satorra-Bentler method was used for the analysis (cf. 
Bentler, 2006, p. 137ff.).  
Missing values were estimated with the maximum likelihood-method, also known as full 
information maximum likelihood (cf. Bentler, 2006, 275ff.). To evaluate model fit, the 
following criteria were evaluated: the Chi-Square value divided by the number of degrees of 
freedom > 3), the comparative fit index (CFI > .90), the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI 
> .90), the Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI > .90), and the Root Mean-Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA < .05) (Kline, 2005, p. 133ff.). 
 
Results 
Study 1: Model Development and Validation 
The data from the study with Swiss citizens in May/June 2008 was used for model 
development, because it is the most comprehensive one of the three data sets. The survey 
of one group of Swiss citizens encompassed 161 interviews. This sample was used for 
model development. The initial model is described in the methods section and encompasses 
three factors that relate to preferences regarding political decision-making processes. The 
factor "consensus orientation" encompasses six items; the factors "competition" and 
"efficiency" include five indicators each. The unstandardized loading of the first indicator was 
fixed to 1.0 to scale the factor. The initial correlated factors model that was developed did not 
                                                 
3  In the written surveys with college students a Likert response format was used and we asked the following 
question: Please answers according to the following scale, to what extend you agree to the following statements. 
The scale ranges from 1 (fully agree) to 7 (do not agree at all). 
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fit the data. Some indicators were not satisfactory and seven of the initial 16 indicators were 
eliminated from the analysis. The resulting modified model encompasses nine indicators and 
is presented in Figure 1, Cronbach’s Alpha was .7.  
 
The modified correlated factors model fits the data quite well (see Table 1). Standardized 
factor loading are structure coefficients that estimate indicator-factor loadings. The factor 
loadings for each set of indicators are relatively high, indicating that the factors are well 
represented by the according items (see Table 2). This also suggests convergent validity. 
Drawing on Boyle (1991) who argues that establishing reliability at the cost of validity is 
problematic, also items with lower factor loadings (< .6) were not eliminated from the model 
in order to satisfy the complexity of the constructs.  
 
The data-driven model modification process resulted in a correlated factor model that 
encompasses three factors with three indicators each. The factor efficiency describes 
preferences regarding the efficiency of political decision-making and includes indicators that 
refer to fast and efficient decision-making processes, simple structures of decision-making 
processes, and the avoidance of delays in political processes. The factor consensus 
orientation describes preferences regarding the fairness and collective behavior of politicians 
and encompasses variables that relate to the question whether one party from time to time 
concedes a point to the other side, the consideration of divergent interests and compromise-
seeking behavior. The factor competition describes preferences regarding the role of 
competition and clear alternative standpoints in political processes. It includes items that 
refer to the decisiveness of political actors that force their point, the ability of political parties 
to put their plans through, and the role of hierarchical orders. 
 
The correlations between the factors indicate that the three factors are distinct. The 
correlation between the factor consensus orientation and the factor competition is 0.2; the 
correlation between the factors consensus orientation and efficiency is 0.3; and the 
correlation between the factors competition and efficiency is 0.66. All correlation but the one 
between the factors consensus orientation and competition are significant at the 5% level. 
Because the correlation between the factors competition and efficiency is not that low, further 
tests were conducted to evaluate the discriminant validity of the scales. 
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Figure 1 
Modified Measurement Model Process Preferences 
Concede a point
Consider divergent interests
Compromises
consensus
orientation
Force their points
Hierarchical orders
competition
Fast decision-making
Simple and short processes
Avoid delays
efficiency
Put their plans through
 
Note. See Table 3 for Variables, Factor Loadings, and Indicator reliabilities (i.e., squared 
multiple correlations) 
 
The modified model was compared with alternative models and a set of multisample 
analyses were conducted to test the alternative models. If the models are nested, that is one 
model is a restricted version of the other, the relative fit of these models can be compared 
with the Chi-Square difference test. 
The specification of a model in which each of the nine indicators loads on only one factor 
provides a precise test of convergent and discriminant validity (Kline, 2005, p. 181). A one-
factor model tests whether the items are measuring one overall factor rather than three 
individual factors. Support for this model would suggest that individuals do not differentiate 
among different dimensions of process preferences and they would best be represented by a 
unidimensional construct (Noar, 2003, p. 633f.). The results of selected fit indices clearly 
indicate poor fit for the one factor model (see Table 1). The fit is significantly worse than the 
fit for the correlated factors model, as the Chi-Square difference test shows.4 Hence, the 
observed variables show discriminant validity and measure more than one domain. The three 
                                                 
4 Given a difference in Degrees of Freedom (df) of 3, the difference in Chi-Square is significant at the level of 5 % 
if it is 7.815 or larger. The Chi-Square difference here is larger than that value. 
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scales allows to measure preferences concerning efficiency, consensus-orientation and 
competition separately.  
An uncorrelated factors model tests the idea that the three factors are independent. Support 
for this model would suggest that the three dimensions of process preferences are 
independent constructs and thus not related to one another (Noar, 2003, p. 634). Retention 
of this model suggests that what is being measured here are really three different constructs. 
As the uncorrelated factors model and the initial correlated factors model are nested, the 
former one being a restricted version of the latter, the relative fit of these models can be 
compared with the Chi-Square difference test. The uncorrelated factor model fitted the data 
not well (see Table 1), and the Chi-Square difference test indicates that the correlated factor 
model fitted the data significantly better.5  
The support for the correlated factor model suggests the possibility of a hierarchical model. A 
hierarchical model tests the idea that a second-order factor can account for relations 
between the three factors. Hence, the unanalyzed association between the correlated factors 
model is replaced by a second-order factor, which has no indicators and is presumed to have 
direct effects on the first-order factors. (Kline, 2005, p. 193). This hierarchical model indicates 
that each of the three preference dimensions are first-order factors that are related to a 
second-order factor termed the general process preference factor. Retention of this model 
supports the idea that these three scales are subscales of one larger scale. Therefore, the 
three scales could be examined individually or summed together into one scale. The 
hierarchical model fits the data exactly equally as well as the correlated factor model. This is 
the case because the second-order parameterization did not gain any degrees of freedom as 
it would with more indicators (Bentler, 2006, p. 45). Given the rather low correlations among 
the factors, however, the correlated factors model was chosen as the superior model.  
Table 1 
Comparison of Alternative Measurement Models of Process Preferences  
   Fit Indexes 
 
Models Chi2 df Chi2/df CFI RMSEA 
One-factor model 88.658 27 3.28 .701 .130 
Uncorrelated factors model 57.633 27 2.13 .851 .092 
Correlated factors model 24.106 24 1.00 1.000 .000 
Hierarchical model 24.106 24 1.00 1.000 .000 
 
                                                 
5 Given a difference in Degrees of Freedom (df) of 3, the difference in Chi-Square is significant at the level of 5 % 
if it is 7.815 or larger. The Chi-Square difference here is larger than that value. 
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Models modified based on empirical data require the validation on an independent sample 
(Kline, 2005). Hence, another sample of Swiss citizens from the same study was used 
(n=372) for validation of the correlated factors model. The invariance in measurement 
models represents a continuum (Bollen, 1989, p. 356). Bollen suggests a hierarchy of 
invariance that can be assessed along two overlapping dimensions: model form and 
similarity in the parameter values. The first level refers to the number of factors. The 
hypothesis to be tested is that there are the same numbers of correlated common factors in 
both groups. Only if equality in model form is given, the similarity in parameter values can be 
tested. With respect to similarity in parameter values, we tested (1) whether the factor 
loadings linking the latent variable to the observed variable are the same in the two samples, 
(2) whether the factor variances and covariances are invariant, and (3) we tested the equality 
of measurement error variances as a higher form of invariance. 
Data analysis supported the hypothesis of invariance in model form. In a set of multiple 
group analyses we then tested the invariance of factor loadings, factor variances and 
covariances, and error variances. All parameters are found to be invariant across both 
samples. The fully constrained comparison results in two equivalent models. Table 2 shows 
the items, factor loadings, and reliabilities of the process preference scales. These results 
clearly support the validity of the scales. The calculated fit indices for the group comparison 
are: Chi2 = 107.643; df = 69; CFI = .963; NFI = .902; NNFI = .957; RMSEA = .046. 
Cronbach’s Alpha in the first sample was .71, in the second sample .67. 
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Table 2 
Items, Factor Loadings, and Indicator Reliabilities of the Process Preferences Scales 
   
Sample 1 
 (n=161) 
 
Sample 2 
 (n=372) 
Latent factor Items 
 
How important is it for you personally that… 
 
Factor 
loadings 
Indicator 
reliabilities 
Factor 
loadings 
Indicator 
reliabilities 
Consensus-
orientation 
     
 .. political parties sometimes concede a 
point to the other side. 
.686 .470 .686 .470 
 … politicians give consideration to diverging 
interests when searching for solutions. 
.757 .573 .757 .573 
 .. political decisions are based on 
compromises.   
.547 .299 .547 .299 
Competition      
 ... politicians are decisive and force their 
points. 
.540 .292 .540 .292 
 ... one political side is able to put their plans 
through. 
.579 .335 .579 .335 
 .. certain politicians could give hierarchical 
orders, if a decision has to be taken. 
.593 .352 .593 .352 
Efficiency      
 .. political problems are solved as fast as 
possible.  
.790 .624 .790 .624 
 ... political decision-making processes are 
simple and short. 
.814 .662 .814 .662 
 ... politicians do avoid delays when making 
political decisions.  
.635 .403 .635 .403 
      
Note. Factor loadings and indicator reliabilities (i.e., squared multiple correlations) of the modified (Sample 1) and 
confirmed scales (Sample 2). 
All factor loadings are significant at the 5 % level  
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Study 2: Test of Cultural Invariance 
Cultural invariance refers to the aspect that a construct has the same meaning in different 
cultures. Measurement invariance is a precondition for interpreting differences in scores in 
different cultures (cf. Bensaou, Coyne, & Venkatraman, 1999; Little, 1997). "Inadequate 
testing for the invariance of data across national groups weakens the interpretations that may 
be derived from cross-national empirical research" (Bensaou, Coyne, & Venkatraman, 1999, 
p. 672).  
We tested the metric invariance of the process preference scales with samples from two 
different cultures: Switzerland as consensus democracy and Germany as rather competitive 
democracy. The data from this comparative survey, however, did not encompass all nine 
scales items. Therefore we were able to test the cultural invariance on a restricted data set 
only. Missing variables are the ones that refer to the question whether political parties should 
concede a point to the other side, one political party is able to put their plans through, and 
delays in political processes are avoided. Thus, for each of the three dimensions the data set 
contains two variables; the variables are shown in Table 3.6  
The test of measurement invariance between cultures also is evaluated as a continuum (cf. 
Bensaou, Coyne, & Venkatraman, 1999; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).Again we tested 
the invariance in model form and the similarity in parameter values, i.e., the invariance of 
factor loadings, the invariance of factor variances and covariances, and the invariance of 
error variances. 
Data analysis supported the hypothesis of invariance in model form. In a set of multiple 
group analyses we then tested the invariance in parameter values. By setting equality 
constraints, we tested the invariance of factor loadings, factor variances and covariances. All 
parameters are found to be invariant across both samples. The model that in addition 
constrained the error variances to be equal across the two groups did not fit the data, 
however. Table 3 shows the items, factor loadings, and reliabilities of the process preference 
scales for the model with equality constraints on the invariance of factor loadings, factor 
variances and covariances. The calculated fit indices for the group comparison are: Chi2= 
32.504; df = 20; CFI = .956; NFI = .887; NNFI = .935; RMSEA  = .058. Cronbach’s Alpha is 
.53 for the Swiss sample and .67 for the German sample. 
                                                 
6 The wording of items in this study is slightly different from the variables in the other two studies. The core 
messages are the same, however. 
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Table 3 
Cultural Invariance of Process Preferences  
 
   
Swiss Sample 
 (n=150) 
 
 
German Sample 
 (n=163) 
Latent factor Items 
 
Please answers according to 
the following scale, to what 
extend you agree to the 
following statements. 
 
Factor 
loadings
Indicator 
reliabilities 
Factor 
loadings 
Indicator 
reliabilities 
Consensus-
orientation 
     
 Politicians should give 
consideration to diverging 
interests when searching for 
solutions. 
.637 .405 
 
.514 .265 
 
 Political solutions are best 
found by searching for 
compromises.   
.551 .303 .520 .271 
 
Competition      
 Politicians should be 
decisive and shouldn’t 
squabble that much. 
 
.649 .421 .822 .676 
 Politicians should give 
hierarchical orders, if a 
decision has to be taken. 
.540 .292 
 
.675 .456 
 
Efficiency      
 Political problems should be 
solved as fast as possible.  
 
.431 .186 
 
.389 .152 
 Simple and easy-to-
understand political 
solutions are better than 
complex programs.  
 
.629 .395 
 
.691 .477 
 
      
Note. Factor loadings and indicator reliabilities (i.e., squared multiple correlations) of the 
Swiss and German samples. 
All factor loadings are significant at the 5 % level  
 
Results clearly indicate that the process preference scales show cultural invariance. 
Therefore, differences in scores on the items can be meaningful compared across countries. 
However, although the factor variances are equivalent, the error variances are not, indicating 
that the indicators might not be equally reliable across constructs (cf. Steenkamp & 
Baumgartner, 1998, p. 81). 
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Study 3: Test of Invariance Regarding Object of Assessment 
In a third study we tested whether the process preferences scales are invariant regarding the 
object of assessment. We distinguished between process preferences concerning the 
executive political branch (i.e., the Swiss government "Bundesrat") and the legislative branch 
(i.e., the Swiss parliament that consists of "Nationalrat" and "Staenderat"). Data from an 
independent survey with Swiss citizens (n=530) was used to test the hypothesis that the 
scales are invariant as regards the object of assessment.  
To test this hypothesis we perceived our data as mulitreat-multimethod (MTMM) data, with 
treats being the nine process preference variables (cf. also the model in Figure 1: concede a 
point, consider diverging interests, compromises, force their points, put their plans through, 
hierarchical orders, fast decision-making, simple and short processes, avoid delays) and 
methods being the two different objects of assessment (parliament and government). The 
conceptualization of our data as MTMM data with methods being the object of assessment is 
considered to be appropriate, because the logic that underlies the analyses of MTMM data 
seems applicable for a test of invariance of measurement regarding different objects of 
assessment. In both cases, the research interest refers to convergent validity, and it is 
investigated whether different methods (or in this case objects of assessment) or concepts 
(traits) explain the variance of observed variables. Convergent validity is given, when the 
variance is explained by traits rather than methods. Hence, if the variance of observed 
process preference variables is explained by process aspects rather than objects of 
assessment, this supports our hypothesis that the scales are invariant as regards the two 
different object of assessment (government and parliament). 
To analyze MTMM data literature suggests several models (cf. Marsh & Bailey 1991; Byrne 
& Goffin, 1993, Lance, Noble, & Scullen, 2007). In this paper we tested our hypothesis of 
scale invariance with three different models. First we followed the Campbell-Fiske-Model 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959) and analyzed the correlation matrix between the variables. 
Convergent validity is described by scores on the same traits measured by different methods 
(objects of assessment here). The so called monotrait-heteromethod (MTHM) values are 
displayed in Table 4 and marked with grey shadows. The correlations are all high and 
significant at the 1% level. 
Although the Campbell-Fiske-Model does support our hypothesis of scale invariance, 
interpretations based on this model are rather preliminary because the model holds several 
limitations (Byrne & Goffin, 1993, p. 69). One of them is, that findings derived from the 
Campbell-Fiske model are used to make inferences regarding the underlying (i.e., latent) 
traits and methods, although it does rely on observed correlations only. Hence, literature 
suggests more elaborated tests of measurement invariance using CFA.  
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
Thus, we also tested our hypothesis as a correlated treat, correlated method (CTCM) model, 
which provides an explanation of the MTMM matrix in terms of underlying latent constructs 
and encompasses not only the matrix, but also the parameter level (Byrne & Goffin, 1993, p. 
69). Because there are only two method factors (government and parliament), we 
constrained the measures loading on the same trait factor to have equal factor loadings for 
identification purposes. Calculating this model did not provide stable solutions, however. 
Such problems of identification are rather common with CTCM models (Marsh & Bailey 
 Correlation Matrix 
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11 gov_concede 
1 ,426** 
,554
** 
,130
** 
,127
** 
,198
** 
-
,100
* 
-,183** 0 
12 gov_div interests 
,426
** 1 
,384
** 0 
,087
* 
,179
** 0 0 0 
13 gov_compromises 
,554
** 
,384
** 1 0 0 0 
-
,106
* 
-,146** 
-
,106
* 
14 gov_fast 
,130
** 0 0 1 
,491
** 
,360
** 
,269
** ,143** 
,208
** 
15 gov_short process 
,127
** 
,087
* 0 
,491
** 1 
,326
** 
,324
** ,226** 
,378
** 
16 gov_avoid delays 
,198
** 
,179
** 0 
,360
** 
,326
** 1 
,224
** 0 
,219
** 
17 gov_force points 
-
,100
* 
0 
-
,106
* 
,269
** 
,324
** 
,224
** 1 ,298** 
,376
** 
18 gov_plans through 
-
,183
** 
0 
-
,146
** 
,143
** 
,226
** 0 
,298
** 1 
,252
** 
19 gov_orders 
0 0 
-
,106
* 
,208
** 
,378
** 
,219
** 
,376
** ,252** 1 
21 parl_ concede 
,603
** 
,399
** 
,388
** 
,126
** 
,202
** 
,183
** 0 0 0 
22 parl_ div interests 
,293
** 
,532
** 
,242
** 0 0 
,143
** 0 0 0 
23 parl_compromises 
,488
** 
,425
** 
,635
** 0 0 
,100
* 0 -,115** 
-
,093
* 
24 parl_fast 
,130
** 0 0 
,637
** 
,541
** 
,446
** 
,268
** ,111* 
,277
** 
25 parl_ short process 
,107
* 
,142
** 0 
,515
** 
,646
** 
,349
** 
,329
** ,197** 
,298
** 
26 parl_ avoid delays 
,142
** 
,121
** 
,095
* 
,424
** 
,355
** 
,611
** 
,199
** 0 
,219
** 
27 parl_ force points 0 0 0 
,192
** 
,267
** 
,152
** 
,389
** ,223** 
,193
** 
28 parl_ plans through 
-
,101
* 
-
,112
* 
-
,128
** 
,181
** 
,165
** 
,091
* 
,235
** ,573** 
,220
** 
29 parl_ orders 0 0 0 
,135
** 
,250
** 0 
,186
** ,251** 
,541
** 
 
* p <.05; ** p <.01. 
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1991). Thus, we do not go into the detail of analysis here. If the CTCM model fails to 
converge to a stable solution, the Correlated-Uniqueness Model (CU) is the most prominent 
alternative model suggested by the literature (Byrne & Goffin, 1993; Lance, Noble, & Scullen, 
2002; Marsh, Byrne, & Craven, 1992).  
Building upon the early work of Kenny (1976) in addressing the problem of ill-defined 
solutions in the CTCM model, Marsh (1988) proposed an alternative CFA approach to 
MTMM analyses that allows method effects to be represented by correlated error/uniqueness 
terms (i.e., error covariances); he termed this parameterization the "correlated uniqueness 
model" (CU). Figure 2 presents the CU Model used to test our hypothesis. Error covariances 
representing the same method were freely estimated. Again, we constrained the measures 
loading on the same trait factor to have equal factor loadings for identification purposes 
(Kenny, 1992, p. 169). 
 
Figure 2 
Correlated Uniqueness Model of Process Preferences With Regard to Different 
Institutions 
concede interests compromises Force point plans orders fast simple No delay
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2911
 
The CU model fitted the data well (Chi$^2$ = 62.721; df = 36; CFI = .991; NFI = .980; NNFI = 
.963; RMSEA  = .036.) The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 5. The trait-factor 
loadings for the CU model were strong (M=.77) and all loadings were statistically significant. 
Each of the correlated uniqueness represents the correlation between two variables sharing 
the same method after removing trait effects (Marsh & Bailey 1991, p. 66). The results 
suggest good convergent validity and lend support to the hypothesis that the proposed 
process preferences scales are invariant as regards the object of assessment, i.e., 
parliament and government. 
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Table 5. Results for the Correlated Uniqueness Model 
 Unique variance and covariance 
  Factor loadings 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
11 gov_concede .843*         
12 gov_div interests  .889*        
13 gov_compromises   .834*       
14 gov_fast    .815*      
15 gov_short process     .785*     
16 gov_avoid delays      .818*    
17 gov_force points       .580*   
18 gov_plans through        .739*  
19 gov_orders         .779* 
21 parl_ concede .730*         
22 parl_ div interests  .642*        
23 parl_compromises   .731*       
24 parl_fast    .815*      
25 parl_ short process     .827*     
26 parl_ avoid delays      .815*    
27 parl_ force points       .679*   
28 parl_ plans through        .775*  
29 parl_ orders         .712* 
  Factor variances and covariances 
1 concede 1.000         
2 div interests   .553* 1.000        
3 compromises   .763*   .618* 1.000       
4 fast   .200*   .101   .036 1.000      
5 short process   .209*   .147*   .026   .823* 1.000     
6 avoid delays   .288*   .217*   .139*   .717*   .612* 1.000    
7 force points  -.006   .071 -.055   .436*   .590*   .356* 1.000   
8 plans through  -.121* -.135 -.204*   .277*   .346*   .158*   .478* 1.000  
9 orders  -.046 -.082 -.121   .326*   .438*   .286*   .419*   .417* 1.000 
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Variable 
 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11 gov_concede   .321*         
12 gov_div interests  -.023   .202*        
13 gov_compromises   .025 -.037   .312*       
14 gov_fast   .001 -.030 -.040   .427*      
15 gov_short process -.025 -.041 -.015 -.023   .817*     
16 gov_avoid delays   .033   .000   .003 -.049 -.061   .278*    
17 gov_force points -.101* -.017 -.073   .052   .030   .070 1.379*   
18 gov_plans through -.102   .055* -.019 -.006   .167* -.002   .223* 1.234*  
19 gov_orders   .088 -.010 -.019 -.001   .199   .071   .418*   .074 1.16* 
           
  
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
 
21 parl_ concede   .688*         
22 parl_ div interests   .241* 1.087*        
23 parl_compromises   .189*   .277*   .618*       
24 parl_fast   .014   .065   .048   .426*      
25 parl_ short process   .101*  -.014   .053   .193   .603*     
26 parl_ avoid delays -.003   .040 -.040   .144*   .105   .284*    
27 parl_ force points -.056  -.015 -.027 -.005*   .011 -.041   .819*   
28 parl_ plans through -.123*  -.147* -.108* -.046 -.040   .014   .336*   .992*  
29 parl_ orders   .066     .145   .023   .032 -.012* -.026   .141   .057 1.737* 
 
Note. Values of 1.00 are fixed a priori; * p <.05. 
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Discussion 
The aim of this paper is to report the development and validation of a standardized scale for 
the measurement of citizens’ preferences concerning processes of political decision-making. 
Whereas there are measurements for policy preferences in previous research, there is no 
standardized scale for the measurement of citizens’ process preferences. Recent research 
building on discrepancy theory from cognitive psychology suggests that process preferences 
are a relevant predictor of the level of confidence citizens have in political institutions. Hence, 
data on process preferences could contribute to the investigation of political attitude 
formation.  
 
The paper presented the development and validation of items measuring citizens’ process 
preferences. Based on a broad literature review three dimensions of process preferences 
were derived: consensus-orientation, competition and efficiency. A theory-driven correlated 
factors model was tested on two independent samples using CFA. Whereas the first sample 
did indicate modification on the model, the second sample was used to validate the modified 
model. Further comparisons with alternative models did indicate that the model is superior to 
a one-factorial model, which underlines discriminant validity. The process preference scales 
encompass three dimensions with several indicators each: consensus-orientation (concede a 
point, consider diverging interests, compromises), competition (force their points, put their 
plans through, hierarchical orders), and efficiency (fast decision-making, simple and short 
processes, avoid delays). Further studies confirmed the cultural equivalence of the scales 
and their invariance as regards two different objects of assessment (parliament, 
government). 
 
This study provides first empirical evidence for the concept of process preferences, but it 
also has several limitations. We tested the invariance of the scales for preferences regarding 
parliament and government, but findings from this study might not hold for other objects of 
assessment, such as the political administrative sector, or individual political actors. 
Furthermore, testing the cultural invariance of the scale with data that encompasses all nine 
variables and data from other countries would enhance the empirical validation of the scales’ 
measurement invariance across different cultures. Moreover, the results might not be 
generalizable to other samples. We used samples that aren’t representative for the Swiss or 
German citizens. Although this is not considered to be problematic for the purpose of scale 
development and validation, we have to bear in mind that the data presented in this paper 
stems from samples that are characterized by a high level of political interest and high levels 
of formal education. Because preferences are based on knowledge and information 
(Druckman & Lupia, 2000), it seems plausible to assume that preferences concerning 
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political processes might not be as diverse or be characterized by a different conceptual 
structure for individuals with low knowledge about politics or no interest in politics. Thus, 
testing the proposed scales on data that stems from samples with participants that are in 
average only moderately or not interested in politics, as well as tests with data from 
individuals with low formal education, are ultimately needed.  
 
The scales presented here are a first attempt to develop a standardized measurement of 
process preferences. The developed scales were successfully validated on another 
independent sample, and further tested for cultural invariance and equivalence as regards 
the object of assessment. A number of applications of the multi-dimensional scale are 
possible. It might contribute to research on political attitude formation, as it allows 
investigating what role the relationship between reality perceptions and individual 
preferences plays in explaining confidence levels. Drawing on discrepancy theory, one would 
expect that higher levels of political confidence are more likely, if perceived aspects of 
political processes are in line with individual process preferences. Lower levels of political 
support are more likely, if perceived aspects of political processes are contrary to what a 
person does prefer. Further research could address this question by including items of the 
process preference scales in surveys on political confidence. 
 - 22 -
References 
 
Bensaou, M., Coyne, M., & Venkatraman, N. (1999). Testing the metric Equivalence in  
Cross-national strategy research: An Empirical Test Across the United States and 
Japan. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 671–689. 
Bentler, P. M. (2006). EQS 6 Structural Equations Program Manual. Encino, CA.: Multivariate 
Software, Inc. 
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural Equations with Latent Variables. Wiley, New York. 
Boyle, G. J. (1991). Does Item Homogeneity indicate internal Consistency or Item 
Redundancy in Psychometric Scales? Personality and Individual Differences, 12(3), 
291-294. 
Byrne, B.M., & Goffin, G.D. (1993). Modelling MTMM Data from Additive and  
Multiplicative Covariance Structures: An Audit of Construct Validity Concordance.  
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 28(1), 67 — 96. 
Campbell, D.T., & Fiske, D.W. (1959). Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the  
 Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
De Mesquita, B. B., & McDermott, R. (2004). Crossing No Man’s land: Cooperation  
From the Tranches. Political Psychology, 25(4), 271-287 
Druckman, J.N., & Lupia, A. (2000). Preference Formation.  Annual Review of Political  
 Science, x(3), 1-24.  
Elster, J. (1989). The Cement of Society: A study of social order. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Verlag. 
Fuchs, D. (1993). Eine Metatheorie des demokratischen Prozesses. Discussion Papers FS 
III 93-202. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2001a). Process Preferences and American Politics: 
What People Want Government to Be. American Political Science Review, 95(1), 
145-153. 
Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2001b). What Would Improve American’s Attitudes 
Towards Their Government? Paper presented at the Conference on Trust in 
Government, Princeton University. 
Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2002). Stealth Democracy: American’s Belief about How 
Government Should Work. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kaase, M., & Newton, K. (1995). Citizens and the State. In M. Kaase & K. Newton (Eds.), 
Beliefs in Government (pp. 130-149). Oxford University Press. 
Kaina, V. (2004). Vertrauen in Eliten und die politische Unterstützung der Demokratie. 
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 45(4), 519-540. 
Kenny, D. A. (1976). An empirical application of confirmatory factor analysis to the  
multitraitmultimethod matrix. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 247-252. 
Kenny, D.A., & Kashy, D.A. (1992). Analysis of the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix by  
 Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 112 (1), 165-172. 
Kimball, D. C., & Patterson, S. C. (1997). Living Up to Expectations: Public Attitudes toward 
Congress. The Journal of Politics, 59(3), 701-728. 
Kline, R. B. (2005). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modelin (2nd ed.). New 
York, London: The Guilford Press. 
Lance, C.E., Noble, C.E., & Scullen, S.E. (2007). A Critique of the Correlated Trait– 
Correlated Method and Correlated Uniqueness Models for Multitrait–Multimethod 
Data. Psychological Methods, 7(2), 228–244. 
Linder, W., & Steffen, I. (2006). Politische Kultur. In U. Klöti, P. Knoepfel, H. Kriesi, W. 
Linder, Y. Papadopoulos & P. Sciarini (Eds.), Handbuch der Schweizer Politik (pp. 
15-34). Zürich: Verlag NZZ. 
Little, T.D. (1997). Mean and Covariance Structures (MACS) Analyses of Cross-Cultural  
Data: Practical and Theoretical Issues. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 32, 53-76.  
Mardia, K.V. (1970). Measures of multivariate skewness and kurtosis with applications.  
 Biometrika, 57(2), 519-530. 
 - 23 -
Mardia, K.V. (1974). Applications of some measures of multivariate skewness and kurtosis in  
 testing normality and robustness studies. Sankhya B, 36(2), 115-128. 
Marsh, H. W. (1988). Multitrait-multimethod analyses. In J. P. Keeves (Ed.), Educational  
research methodology, measurement and evaluation: An international handbook. 
Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Marsh, H.W., & Bailey, M. (1991). Confirmatory Factor Analyses of Multitrait-Multimethod  
Data: A Comparison of Alternative Models. Applied Psychological Measurement, 15, 
47-70. 
Marsh, H.W., Byrne, B.M., & Craven, R. (1992). Overcoming Problems in Confirmatory  
Factor Analyses of MTMM Data: The Correlated Uniqueness Model and Factorial 
Invariance. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 27(4), 489 — 507. 
Matthes, J., Wirth, W., & Schemer, C. (2007). Measuring the Unmeasurable? Toward 
Operationalizing On-line and Memory-Based Political Judgments in Surveys. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 19(2), 247-257. 
Noar, S. M. (2003). The Role of Structural Equation Modeling in Scale Development. 
Structural Equation Modeling, 10(4), 622-647. 
Patterson, S. C., Boynton, G. R., & Hedlund, R. D. (1969). Perceptions and Expectations of 
the Legislature and Support for It. The American Journal of Sociology, 75(1), 62-76. 
Steenkamp, J.E.M, & Baumgartner, H (1998): Assessing Measurement Invariance in Cross- 
National Consumer Research. The Journal of Consumer Research, 25(1), 78-90. 
Thibaut, J., & Walker, J. (1975). Procedural Justice: A Psychological analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Tyler, T. (2000). Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral 
Engagement. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 
Tyler, T., Degoey, P., & Smith, H. (1996). Understanding Why the Justice of Group 
Procedures Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value 
Model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 913-930. 
Weatherford, S. M. (1992). Measuring Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science 
Review, 86(1), 149-166. 
West, S.G., Finch, J.F., & Curran, P.J. (1995). Structural Equation Modeling with nonnormal 
variables. Problems and remedies. In R.H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural Equation Modeling: 
Concepts, Issues, Applications (pp. 56-75). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Yuan, K.-H., Lambert, P.L., & Fouladi, R.T. (2004). Mardia’s Multivariate Kurtosis with 
Missing Data. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39(3), 413-437. 
 
 
